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Abstract 
Background: Attentional and memory biases are viewed as crucial cognitive processes 
underlying symptoms of depression. However, it is still unclear whether these two biases are 
uniquely related to depression or whether they show substantial overlap. Methods: We 
investigated the degree of specificity and overlap of attentional and memory biases for 
depressotypic stimuli in relation to depression and anxiety by means of meta-analytic 
commonality analysis. By including four published studies, we considered a pool of 463 
healthy and subclinically depressed individuals, different experimental paradigms, and 
different psychological measures. Results: Memory bias is reliably and strongly related to 
depression and, specifically, to symptoms of negative mood, worthlessness, feelings of 
failure, and pessimism. Memory bias for negative information was minimally related to 
anxiety. Moreover, neither attentional bias nor the overlap between attentional and memory 
biases were significantly related to depression. Limitations: Limitations include cross-
sectional nature of the study. Conclusions: Our study showed that, across different paradigms 
and psychological measures, memory bias (and not attentional bias) represents a primary 
mechanism in depression.   
 
Keywords: attentional bias, memory bias, depression, anxiety, depressive symptoms, 
commonality analysis, meta-analysis 
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Introduction 
Depression is a common mental disorder with substantial individual and societal burden 
(Cuijpers, Beekman, & Reynolds, 2012; Gustavsson et al., 2011), including reduced well-
being, impaired global functioning, and increased mortality (Lépine & Briley, 2011). These 
issues are not limited to depressed patients, but are often present to a lesser extent in 
individuals with mild depressive symptoms who do not meet full criteria for major depression 
(Cuijpers et al., 2014). In fact, studies show that subclinical depression is not only highly 
prevalent (Cuijpers, de Graaf, & van Dorsselaer, 2004), but also characterized by significant 
psychosocial disability (Judd et al., 2000) and higher risk of future major depression (Cuijpers 
& Smit, 2004). Therefore, investigating the structure of the depressotypic characteristics 
during the subclinical phase is of paramount importance to understand depression and, 
potentially, prevent the development of its clinical form (Munoz, Beardslee, & Leykin, 2012; 
Munoz & Bunge, 2016). 
In an attempt to gain insight into the network of depressotypic characteristics, an 
extensive body of research has focused on emotional biases in basic cognitive processes, also 
known as cognitive biases (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Cognitive biases refer to a tendency to 
process emotional information so as to favor certain types of emotional valence or meaning 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). In the context of depression, these biases primarily include 
increased processing of negative information at the expense of neutral and positive 
information (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Winer & Salem, 2016). That is, whereas 
asymptomatic individuals show a preference for positive stimuli (Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & 
Sander, 2016), subclinically depressed individuals have been shown to allocate more attention 
to negative stimuli (Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005) and recall more 
negative memories (Hertel, 1998). Importantly, research shows that attention and memory 
biases predict the course of depressive symptoms over time (Disner, Shumake, & Beevers, 
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2017; Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2015; Goldstein, Hayden, & Klein, 2015; Johnson, 
Joormann, & Gotlib, 2007; Osinsky, Losch, Hennig, Alexander, & MacLeod, 2012). 
Therefore, cognitive biases can be considered as risk factors for symptoms of depression 
(Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001). 
One important limitation that characterizes most previous research is that basic 
processes, such as attention and memory biases, were considered in isolation. Typically, 
studies have examined the association of depressive symptoms with one single bias at a time 
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). On the contrary, investigators are 
increasingly arguing that cognitive biases function in concert to detrimentally impact 
emotional well-being and lead to full-blown depression (Beck & Bredemeier, 2016; Everaert, 
Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). As such, studies need to examine multiple cognitive biases in 
order to scrutinize their unique as well as common association with depressive symptoms. By 
doing so, it would be possible to cast new light on how biased information-processing 
mechanisms, either individually or in combination, influence depressive symptoms. 
Research on the interplay among attentional bias, memory bias, and depressive 
symptoms in subclinical samples has so far yielded interesting but mixed findings. On the one 
hand, studies show that across different methods attentional and memory biases are correlated 
with depressive symptoms with variable magnitude, ranging from negligible to moderate (De 
Voogd, Wiers, Prins, & Salemink, 2014; Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014; Everaert, Tierens, 
Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013; Platt, Murphy, & Lau, 2015; Reid, Salmon, & Lovibond, 2006; 
Sanchez, Everaert, De Putter, Mueller, & Koster, 2015). On the other hand, although previous 
research provided some indications that attentional bias may predict subsequent memory bias 
(Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 2011; Koster, De Raedt, Leyman, & De Lissnyder, 2010), a fine-
grained examination of how these two cognitive biases are simultaneously related to 
depression severity has yet to be conducted.  
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For all these reasons, it is timely to examine the unique and common contributions (i.e., 
the association structure) of these biases that are putatively important to the severity of 
depression (Cumming, 2012; Everaert et al., 2012; Kraemer et al., 2001). Several scenarios 
are possible. For example, if attentional bias and memory bias are highly correlated (i.e., 
multicollinearity), then most of the variance explained in depressive symptoms by one bias 
would interchangeably be explained by the other bias (i.e., overlap or the area represented as 
‘C’ in Figure 1). Alternatively, if the association between these two biases is weak or modest 
then one would expect that different biases mostly have unique associations with depressive 
symptoms (specificity or the areas represented as ‘U1’ and ‘U2’ in Figure 1). It is worth 
mentioning that by closely investigating the association structure, it is possible to detect 
effects that would otherwise go undetected with standard analytic approaches (i.e., zero-order 
correlations and regression beta weights), such as suppression (Friedman & Wall, 2005; 
Kraha, Turner, Nimon, Zientek, & Henson, 2012). Therefore, the first goal of this study is to 
quantify the association structure (i.e., unique and common partitions) of attentional bias and 
memory bias with respect to subclinical depression. 
Attentional bias and memory bias are likely to play an important role in disorders other 
than depression. In fact, not only is depression often comorbid with anxiety (Borsboom, 
Cramer, Schmittmann, Epskamp, & Waldorp, 2011; Crawford & Henry, 2003), but also these 
two phenomena share partially similar underlying processes, such as negative affectivity 
(Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998). In keeping with this, the Research Domain Criteria of the 
National Institute of Mental Health (RDoC; Insel et al., 2010) frames attentional bias and 
memory bias as components of the psychobiological systems responsible for negative affect 
and characterizing both depression and anxiety (Negative Valence Systems; Sanislow et al., 
2010). Therefore, our second goal is to quantify the degree of specificity and overlap of 
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attentional bias and memory bias for negative stimuli in relation to anxiety symptoms, as 
compared to depressive symptoms.   
Third, recent research stresses the heterogeneity of the depressive syndrome (Fried & 
Nesse, 2015), by showing that individual depressive symptoms vary on their genetic (Myung 
et al., 2012) or etiological (Fried, Nesse, Zivin, Guille, & Sen, 2014) background and their 
impact on psychosocial functioning (Fried & Nesse, 2014). Moreover, Marchetti, Loeys, 
Alloy, and Koster (2016) showed that major cognitive risk factors for depression (e.g., 
dysfunctional attitudes, rumination, and hopelessness) are differently related to depressive 
symptoms. Hence, in order to explore the scenario by which cognitive biases may be 
distinctively associated with individual depressive symptoms, we investigate the association 
structure of attentional and memory bias with each single depressive symptom. By doing so, 
we are able to detect links between biases and symptoms that would otherwise be unexplained 
when dealing with total scores.  
With these three goals in mind, we analyzed four previously collected datasets, 
consisting of both student and community samples. In order to fully capture the depressive 
spectrum, we made sure that our samples showed substantial variability in depressive and 
anxiety symptoms (Haslam, Holland, & Kuppens, 2012). In all four datasets, standard 
paradigms for attentional bias (e.g., spatial cueing task, dot-probe task, and eye movements 
for emotional words) and memory bias (i.e., retrieval of emotional sentences and retrieval of 
emotional self-attributed adjectives) were used, along with measures of depressive symptoms 
and anxiety symptoms. Importantly, the attentional and memory biases were considered with 
respect to depression-congruent material, such as stimuli featuring themes of sadness, loss, 
self-worthlessness, etc. (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Next, we analyzed the association 
structure (i.e., specificity and overlap) for each single study, with attentional and memory bias 
entered as predictors and either depression severity or anxiety severity serving as outcome. 
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Then, in line with recent statistical guidelines promoting meta-analytic thinking (Cumming, 
2012), we ran a fixed-effect meta-analytic commonality analysis for every tested model so as 
to obtain method/sample-independent results. Finally, we investigated the association 
structure of cognitive biases with each single depressive symptom. 
Methods 
The present research presents data from four independent studies: Study #1 (Everaert et 
al., 2013), Study #2 (Everaert et al., 2014), Study #3 (Everaert et al., 2017), and Study #4 
(Pearson, McGeary, Maddox, & Beevers, 2016).  
Participants.  
Study #1 included 64 undergraduate students (mean age: 19.79 ± 4.52, range: 17 – 48, 
88.52% female). Study #2 included 70 undergraduate students (mean age: 20.31 ± 2.73, 
range: 17 – 33, 87.32% female; from the original 71 participants, 1 was excluded due to 
missing data on the memory bias task). Study #3 included 109 undergraduates (mean age: 
21.65, 84.82% female; from the original 112 participants, 3 participants were excluded due to 
missing data on the memory bias task). Students in these three studies were from Ghent 
University (Belgium). In Study #4, 220 individuals from the community of Austin, TX (US) 
were recruited (mean age: 25.05 ± 4.3, range: 18 – 35, 58.18% female; 61.36% were 
Caucasian, 20% Asian, 4.55% African American, 8.09% multiracial, and 6% did not endorse 
race) and were assessed with Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (Sheehan et al., 
1998) to determine the absence of any current Axis I disorders.  
Materials 
Questionnaires. To measure depressive symptoms, the following instruments were used: 
the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) in Studies 
#1, #2, and #3 (α = .86, .92, .93); and the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 
(CESD; Radloff, 1977) in Study #4 (α = .86). Individual levels of anxiety symptoms were 
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measured with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) in Study #1 and #2 (α = .92, .93), the Anxiety subscale of the 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales – 42 items (DASS-Anx; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
in Study #3 (α = .90), and the Anxious Arousal subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire (MASQ-AA; Wardenaar et al., 2010, administered to 101 individuals only) in 
Study #4. Note that in each of the four studies, additional measures, unrelated to the current 
study’s goals, were administered. 
Attentional bias. In Study #1, attentional bias was operationalized using a modified 
spatial cueing task (Koster et al., 2010). On each trial, a black placeholder was presented to 
the left and right of a fixation cross. Then, a positive, negative, or neutral cue word appeared 
for 1500 ms in the space previously held by one of the placeholders. Upon stimulus offset, a 
dot appeared either in the same or opposite location of the cue word (i.e., valid vs. invalid 
trials, respectively). Participants were required to indicate the position of the dot by pressing 
the appropriate key on a keyboard as quickly and accurately as possible. A cue validity (CV) 
index was computed as the reaction time (RT) difference between invalid and valid trials. 
Attentional bias was operationalized as the difference between CV of negative trials and CV 
of neutral trials (diffCVneg). Higher scores represent more attention for negative relative to 
neutral words. Twenty negative, twenty neutral, and twenty positive words were used. Fifteen 
practice trails and two test blocks (each consisting of 120 trials) were administered to each 
participant (for further methodological details, see Everaert et al., 2013).  
In Studies #2 and #3, attentional bias was operationalized as selective attention in the 
context of a Scrambled Sentences Test (SST; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Specifically, eye-
movements were recorded while participants were unscrambling emotional sentences (i.e., 
“born I loser am winner a”) into positive or negative meanings (i.e., “I am a born winner” vs. 
“I am a born loser”). Each scrambled sentence contained six words that were shown for a 
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maximum of 8 s, and participants were required to report the first sentence that comes to mind 
by using five of the six displayed words. Note that each emotional scrambled sentences 
presented one positive and one negative word. Attentional bias was operationalized as the 
ratio between the number of fixations on negative words and the total number of fixations on 
emotional (negative and positive) words (Fixneg). A total of 60 (Study #2) or 28 (Study #3) 
emotional scrambled sentences were administered to each participant (for further 
methodological details, see (Everaert et al., 2014, 2017).  
In Study #4, attentional bias was measured with the emotional dot-probe task. After the 
offset of the initial fixation cross, a pair of stimuli depicting emotional (sad or happy) or 
neutral facial expression was shown for 1000 ms. Next, a target (either the letter “O” or “Q”) 
replaced one of the two stimuli and the participant was required to classify the letter either as 
“O” or “Q”. Twelve sad, 12 happy, and 24 neutral facial expressions were shown four times in 
two different blocks, for a total of 192 trials (for further methodological details, see (Pearson 
et al., 2016)). In the context of the dot-probe task, attentional bias for negative information 
was operationalized as an attentional bias score (ABS; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & 
Joormann, 2004), in accordance to the following formula: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆 =
1
2
([𝑅𝑡𝐿𝑠 − 𝑅𝑡𝑅𝑠] + [𝐿𝑡𝑅𝑠 − 𝐿𝑡𝐿𝑠]) 
where R indicates right position, L indicates left position, t indicates target, and s 
indicates sad word stimulus. Positive values for ABS reflect a bias toward negative stimuli, 
whereas negative ABS values indicate a bias away from negative stimuli. It worth mentioning 
that similar results were obtained when attentional bias was operationalized as trial-level bias 
scores (TL-BS; Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2015), such as mean TL-BS toward negative 
information, mean TL-BS away from negative information, and TL-BS variability.    
Memory bias. In Studies #1, #2, and #3, upon completion of the SST and a subsequent 
filler task, participants were requested to accurately recall the sentences they had unscrambled 
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previously (i.e., incidental free recall test). Memory bias was operationalized as the ratio 
between the number of (correctly remembered) negative sentences and the number of all 
(correctly remembered) emotional sentences (SSTneg-recall). 
In Study #4, the self-referent encoding task (SRET; Derry & Kuiper, 1981) was 
administered. During this task participants were shown 52 interpersonally oriented adjectives 
(26 positive and 26 negative). Participants were required to decide as quickly as possible 
whether they endorsed each adjective as self-referential. After completion of the SRET, 
participants were requested to accurately recall the adjectives they had seen previously. Here, 
MB was operationalized as ratio between negative endorsed adjectives recalled and all the 
endorsed adjectives recalled (SRETneg-recall).  
Additional notes. In Studies #1, #2, and #3, the same material (i.e., emotional words) was 
used in the experimental paradigms capturing attentional and memory biases. In Study #4, 
different material was used (i.e., emotional faces in the dot probe task and emotional words 
[adjectives] in the SRET).     
Statistical Analysis 
We reported mean, standard deviation, range, and Pearson’s correlations among the set 
of variables considered throughout the four studies included. Then, in order to investigate the 
association structure between attentional bias and memory bias and in accounting for the 
criterion variable (i.e., depressive symptoms and anxiety symptoms), we ran a series of 
commonality analyses. Commonality analysis is a variance partitioning technique adopted to 
decompose model fit (R2) into non-overlapping uniquely and commonly explained partitions 
(Kraha et al., 2012; Marchetti et al., 2016; Prunier, Colyn, Legendre, Nimon, & Flamand, 
2015; Ray-Mukherjee et al., 2014).  
When dealing with two predictors, commonality analysis yields three partitions (Figure 
1), namely two partitions reflecting the amount of variance uniquely explained by either 
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attentional bias (U1) or memory bias (U2) and a third partition reflecting the amount of 
variance that can be explained interchangeably by either attentional or memory bias (C). The 
unique partition can be taken as indicating the degree of specificity of one predictor after 
controlling for the other ones, and it mathematically equates to squared semi-partial 
correlation. The common partition is to be taken as reflecting the degree of overlap of the two 
predictors in accounting for the criterion variable. Importantly, unlike unique partitions, the 
common partition may assume both positive and negative values, with negative values 
suggesting the possible presence of suppressor predictor variables (Kraha et al., 2012).  
In line with guidelines calling for bootstrapping (Nimon, Oswald, & Roberts, 2012; 
Prunier et al., 2015; Zientek & Thompson, 2006), we adopted percentile-based 95% two-
tailed bootstrap confidence intervals (10,000 bootstrap samples). At the level of each single 
partition, bootstrap estimation was used to quantify the precision of each partition rather than 
to accomplish null-hypothesis significance testing. The reason for this caveat is that, unlike 
common partitions, unique partitions are always positive; therefore, bootstrap confidence 
intervals containing zero are not possible. Moreover, all the partitions are quantified as R2 and 
they can be conventiently viewed as effect sizes (e.g., < 1% negligible, > 1% small, > 9% 
moderate, and > 25% large; Cohen, 1988). For all these reasons, we primarily referred to and 
commented on the practical significance of the reported effects (Durlak, 2009). All the 
commonality analyses were conducted in R 3.2.2, using the yhat 2.0 package (Nimon et al., 
2012).  
Finally, in accordance with current statistical guidelines promoting meta-analytic 
thinking (Cumming, 2012), we integrated commonality analysis with meta-analysis. In this 
way, we could obtain a meta-analytic synthesis for each model across the four samples. 
Assuming that there is one true population effect, which underlies all the studies included in 
the analysis, we performed a fixed-effect meta-analysis. The population effect is estimated 
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using a weighted mean, where the weight assigned to each study is the inverse of that study’s 
variance. In each bootstrap sample, such fixed-effect can be estimated, and a 95% confidence 
interval for the common effect can be obtained. Moreover, when comparing the same 
partitions across two different models (i.e., unique component of memory bias for depressive 
symptoms vs. for anxiety symptoms), we calculated the difference in unique and common 
meta-analytic effects between outcomes in every bootstrap sample, and similarly obtained a 
95% confidence interval for the difference. 
In sum, across the four included studies, we ran two meta-analytic commonality 
analyses with attentional bias and memory bias accounting for depression total score, and 
anxiety total score. Then, in order to account for any possible link between biases and 
individual depressive symptoms, we ran a meta-analytic commonality analysis with the two 
cognitive biases accounting for each of the twenty one depressive symptoms as listed by the 
BDI-II in Studies #1, #2, and #3. It is worth stressing that given the impossibility to match the 
single items of the measure for depression in Study #4 (CESD) one-to-one onto the BDI-II 
items, Study #4 was not included in the meta-analytic synthesis, but analyzed with a standard 
(i.e., non-meta-analytic) commonality analysis. Given the difference in the analytic method 
(i.e., inverse-variance weighting VS. no-weighting), we primarily commented on the first 
tertile of the most explained symptoms across the two analyses. 
Results 
Descriptive and Correlation Analysis 
Means, standard deviations, ranges, and Pearson’s correlations among attentional bias, 
memory bias, depression total score, and anxiety total score across the four included studies 
are reported in Table 1. 
Association structure of cognitive biases with depression severity 
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Table 2 and Figure 2 show the results of the commonality analysis with 95%-bootstrap 
CIs for both models across the four studies and the fixed-effect estimator. At the meta-analytic 
level, the unique component of memory bias was the only partition to meaningfully explain 
the depression total score (16.43% [11.19%; 23.62%], moderate effect). Neither the unique 
component of attentional bias nor the overlap between attentional and memory biases 
emerged as meaningful predictors of depression (1.07% [0.32%; 3.66%], small effect; -0.24% 
[-1.49%; 1.07%], negligible effect respectively).  
Association structure of cognitive biases with anxiety severity and comparison with the 
depressotypic association structure 
With respect to anxiety severity, at a meta-analytic level, the unique component of 
memory bias accounted for a limited amount of variance (4.97% [2.50%; 10.62%], small 
effect), whereas both the unique component of attentional bias and the overlap between 
attentional and memory bias did not show any association with anxiety severity (1.35% 
[0.39%; 5.59%], small effect; 0.03% [-0.80%; 1.16%], negligible effect respectively). Finally, 
at the meta-analytic level the unique component of memory bias explained significantly more 
variance for depression severity than for anxiety severity (11.46% [4.98%; 17.56%]), whereas 
neither attentional bias nor the overlap between attentional and memory bias were statistically 
different across the two models (-0.28% [-4.01%; 1.94%]; and -0.28% [-1.7%; 1.06%]; 
respectively) (Figure 3).  
Association structure of cognitive biases with depressive symptoms.  
The meta-analytic commonality analysis on the twenty-one depressive symptoms, as 
listed by BDI-II (Studies #1, #2, #3), revealed that the unique component of memory bias 
primarily explained sadness, pessimism, indecision, self-aversion, feelings of failure, 
suicidality, and worthlessness. All the other depressive symptoms were accounted for to a 
limited degree (see Figure 4 and Table S1). Importantly, the commonality analysis at the level 
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of each single depressive symptom, as measured by the CESD in Study #4, conveyed 
converging results with the previous analysis (see Figure 4 and Table S2), in that feelings of 
failure, sadness, depressed mood, hopelessness, worthlessness, lack of joy of life, lack of 
happiness, and loneliness were the symptoms explained by the unique component of memory 
bias. In general, the unique component of attentional bias and the common partition between 
attentional and memory bias were not associated in a meaningful way to any depressive 
symptom. 
Discussion 
Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of interest in the interplay between attention 
and memory biases as risk factors for depression. Yet a fine-grained examination of their 
degree of association with subclinical depression has never been conducted. To fill this gap, 
the present study aimed to quantify the magnitude of specificity and overlap of attentional and 
memory biases with depression and anxiety severity. This study further aimed to explore the 
specificity and overlap of these two biases with respect to each single depressive symptom 
reported on common self-report measures of depression. Finally, in order to obtain more 
generalizable and reliable estimates, we ran a fixed-effect meta-analysis that allowed us to 
synthetize information derived from different paradigms and different psychological 
measures.  
The major findings of our study are as follows. First, at a meta-analytic level, the 
magnitude of the association of the unique contribution of memory bias to depressive 
symptoms was substantial (~16%, moderate effect), whereas the magnitude of the same 
partition to anxiety symptoms was minimal (~5%, small effect). Importantly, these two 
estimates were significantly different. This result is particularly interesting considering the 
strong correlation between anxiety and depression (weighted r = 0.64, n = 344), as it suggests 
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that enhanced recall of depression-congruent material (e.g., sadness-, loss-, and worthlessness-
related stimuli) is a specific marker of subclinical depression, but not for subclinical anxiety.  
In keeping with previous evidence showing the robust association of memory bias with 
clinical depression (Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2003; Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992), our 
study indicates that preferential recall of depressotypic information is already present in 
individuals who are at-risk to develop a major depression. It is worth stressing that this result 
held across different samples, different tasks, different stimulus type, and different measures 
of symptoms of depression and anxiety. In addition, previous studies show that enhanced 
recall of threatening material characterizes anxiety (Mitte, 2008), while our study 
complements this evidence by showing that memory bias for depressotypic stimuli is hardly 
present in individuals with anxiety symptoms. 
Second, the unique component of memory bias was specifically related to a subgroup of 
cognitive-emotional symptoms, largely mapping on depressed mood, feelings of failure, 
worthlessness, and pessimism, along with suicidality, indecision, and feelings of loneliness. 
The strong association between memory bias and depressed mood is interesting, especially 
considering that low mood is the depressive symptom contributing the most to concurrent 
global impairment (Fried & Nesse, 2014). Moreover, the link between memory bias, 
worthlessness, and pessimism intriguingly suggests that enhanced retrieval for depression-
congruent material might potentially function as a mechanism underlying two main hubs of 
depression, namely the negative view of the self and of the future (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & 
Beck, 2011; Roepke & Seligman, 2016). Altogether, these findings confirm that memory bias 
is strongly related to important elements of the depressotypic network that are likely to impact 
current and, perhaps, future mental well-being. Contrariwise, memory bias was completely 
unrelated to physiological-somatic symptoms of depression that are crucial for psychosocial 
functioning, such as concentration problems and fatigue (Fried & Nesse, 2014).  
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Interestingly, the differential association of memory bias with depressive symptoms 
mirrors the view recently proposed (Beck & Bredemeier, 2016). According to the authors, in 
response to a perceived loss, two parallel and relatively independent processes are initiated, 
namely the cognitive path and the physiological path. While the former is characterized by 
negative thoughts that allegedly cause the cognitive-emotional symptoms (e.g., sadness, 
worthlessness, suicidal ideation, etc.), the latter entails both autonomic and immune responses 
that lead to sickness-behaviors symptoms (e.g., fatigue, anhedonia, anorexia, etc.). In sum, 
memory bias seems to be mostly related to the cognitive dimension of depression, rather than 
mapping onto its physiological-somatic component (Fried & Nesse, 2014). 
Third, the unique component of attentional bias for depressotypic material did not 
emerge as a meaningful predictor in accounting for depression severity or any depressive 
symptom. Although this null finding could be due to methodological limitations that 
characterize the current paradigms for attentional bias (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009), our 
study is in line with previous evidence showing that the association between attentional bias 
and depression is not robust (Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2017; Mogg & Bradley, 2005). 
Moreover, our investigation documented a negligible direct association between attentional 
bias and anxiety severity, although this result could depend on the way this bias was 
operationalized. That is, we specifically focused on biased attention for depression-congruent 
material (Peckham et al., 2010), and not threatening stimuli that have been shown to be 
particularly salient for anxious individuals (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007).  
In sum, these findings may indicate that the role of biased attention toward depressive 
material as a direct correlate of subclinical depression and anxiety is limited. It is crucial to 
stress, however, that as a basic process attention is involved in many cognitive processes that 
are essential for mental functioning. For instance, evidence from cognitive science shows that 
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attention is fundamental for memory recall (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007) and, more broadly, 
for many higher-order functions, such as appraisal and decision making (Chun, Golomb, & 
Turk-Browne, 2011). Therefore, it is possible that attention plays a major role in depression, 
though not at the level of depressive symptoms, but rather as a distal mechanism. This idea of 
attention as a distal mechanism of depression will be discussed further below.  
Fourth, the overlap between attentional and memory bias did not substantially account 
for any of the considered outcomes, as sporadically documented in studies with clinical and 
non-clinical samples (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; Vrijsen, van Oostrom, Isaac, Becker, & 
Speckens, 2014). Although unexpected, this finding does not invalidate the theoretical models 
invoking the involvement of multiple biases in depression (Everaert et al., 2012), but it rather 
spurs a more fine-grained specification of their possible interplay. The absence of any direct 
association between depressive symptoms and attentional bias, neither as a unique nor an 
overlapping partition, suggests that biased attention might exert its influence on depression 
mostly via indirect pathways (Kraemer et al., 2001; Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). In keeping with 
this idea, a recent cross-sectional study showed that attentional bias can account for 
concurrent depressive symptoms via multiple mediation of interpretation bias, ruminative 
thinking, and emotion regulation strategies (Everaert et al., 2017). Therefore, although we did 
not find evidence of an overlap between the two considered biases in subclinical samples, 
other types of interplay between these biases are possible and worth exploring.  
Despite these novel and intriguing findings, our study is characterized by several 
limitations. First, all the included studies are cross-sectional; therefore it is not possible to 
make any causal claims on the role of cognitive biases in leading to depression. Future studies 
using either prospective or experimental design could use the partitioning approach adopted in 
our study to investigate the unique and overlapping causal effects of cognitive biases on 
depression. Second, in our investigation, we included only biases in basic cognitive processes. 
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Although other processes may be of relevance (e.g. interpretation bias, emotional associations, 
or intrusive ideation; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), the inclusion of variables closely 
mirroring the symptom contents could artificially inflate their association with the outcome 
variables, via either content redundancy or common-method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Furthermore, in future studies, more fine-grained sub-processes for 
each cognitive bias could be considered, such as disengagement impairments from negative 
information as a proxy for attentional bias (Gotlib and Joormann, 2010). Third, the included 
studies had different features, including students and community samples, different 
paradigms, different types of stimuli, and same/different set of stimuli across the biases-
related tasks. Although this enhanced the generalizability of our findings, we could not 
investigate the moderating effect of these variables due to power issues. Future large-scale 
systematic reviews should take these features into account and better qualify the role played 
by these moderators.  
In closing, we believe that our study of the association structure between cognitive 
biases and depression is an important step in further understanding the relationship between 
information processing and depression. By adopting a meta-analytic perspective (Cumming, 
2012), we considered multiple paradigms and psychological measures and provided robust 
and reliable evidence on the differential role of attentional and memory biases in relation to 
depression and anxiety. 
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Figures Caption 
Figure 1. Commonality analysis with attentional bias and memory bias used as predictors 
and either depressive symptoms or anxiety symptoms as outcome. U1 and U2: variance 
explained uniquely (i.e., specificity) by attentional bias (U1) and memory bias (U2), 
respectively. C1: variance explained interchangeably (i.e., overlap) by attentional bias or 
memory bias. 
 
Figure 2. Commonality analysis and meta-analytic commonality analysis (95% 
bootstrap confidence intervals) with attentional bias and memory bias accounting for 
depression total score (upper part) and anxiety total score (lower part).  
 
Figure 3. Comparison of the meta-analytic partitions across models (depression total 
score vs. anxiety total score). 
 
Figure 4. Meta-analytic commonality on BDI-II depressive symptoms (upper part) and 
commonality analysis on CESD depressive symptoms (lower part). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s zero-order correlations for Studies #1, #2, #3, and #4 
 
Study #1 (n = 64) M (SD) Min Max AB MB Depressive 
Symptoms 
Anxiety 
Symptoms 
diffCVneg (AB) -7.70 (55.04) -133.5 159.5 1    
SSTneg-recall (MB) 41.34 (35.12) 0 100 .10 1   
BDI-II (Depr. symp) 15.23  (8.59) 0 40 .19 .52*** 1  
STAI-T (Anx. symp) 47.92 (11.55)  25 72 .24 .48*** .85*** 1 
Study #2 (n = 70) M (SD) Min Max AB MB Depressive 
Symptoms 
Anxiety 
Symptoms 
NegFix (AB) 49.94  (4.36) 40 60 1    
SSTneg-recall (MB) 29.72 (26.72) 0 100 .18 1   
BDI-II (Depr. symp) 13.56  (9.57) 0 40 .27* .33** 1  
STAI-T (Anx. symp) 45.72 (11.84) 24 71 .22 .34** .81*** 1 
Study #3 (n = 109) M (SD) Min Max AB MB Depressive 
Symptoms 
Anxiety 
Symptoms 
Fixneg (AB) 0.49  (0.05) 0.33 0.6 1    
SSTneg-recall (MB) 31.34 (30.47) 0 100 .28** 1   
BDI-II (Depr. symp) 10.94 (10.00) 0 49 .05 .34*** 1  
DASS-Anx (Anx. symp) 6.13  (6.72) 0 33 -0.03 .23* .60*** 1 
Study #4 (n = 220) M (SD) Min Max AB MB Depressive 
Symptoms 
Anxiety 
Symptoms 
ABS (AB) 0.77 (26.23) -73.27 125.2 1    
SRETneg-recall (MB) 0.14  (0.18) 0 1 .09 1   
CESD (Depr. symp) 8.78  (6.78) 0 31 -.07 .48*** 1  
MASQ-AA (n = 101) (Anx. 
symp) 
21.10  (5.62) 17 57 -.07 .16 .43*** 1 
Note: AB: attentional bias; MB: memory bias 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 2. Meta-analytic commonality analysis for depression and anxiety 
Depression Total Score 
Commonali
ty Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.2845, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = .1527, 
n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = .1176, n 
= 109 
Study #4, R2 = .2460, n 
= 220 
Fixed-effect common 
estimator, n = 463 
U(AB)  2.01% 
[0%; 13.1%] 
4.65% 
[0.03%; 20.06%] 
0.22% 
[0%; 4.87%] 
1.26% 
[0.02%; 4.68%] 
1.07% 
[0.32%; 3.66%] 
U(MB) 24.79% 
[9.23%; 43.04%] 
7.92% 
[0.49%; 22.60%] 
11.51% 
[1.58%; 27.65%] 
24.16% 
[13.65%; 34.88%] 
16.43% 
[11.19%; 23.62%] 
C(AB OR 
MB) 
1.65% 
[-1.84%; 8.96%] 
2.71% 
[-0.71%; 9.29%] 
0.03% 
[-3.36%; 4.01%] 
-0.83% 
[-2.14%; 0.83%] 
-0.24% 
[-1.49%; 1.07%] 
Anxiety Total Score 
Commonali
ty Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.2705, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = .1425 , 
n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = .0644, n 
= 109 
Study #4, R2 = .0309, n 
= 101 
Fixed-effect common 
estimator, n = 344 
U(AB) 3.64% 
[0.01%; 17.26%] 
2.70% 
[0.01%; 13.64%] 
0.95% 
[0%; 6.59%] 
0.48% 
[0%; 9.21%] 
1.35% 
[0.39%; 5.59%] 
U(MB) 21.43% 
[7.5%; 39.93%] 
9.26% 
[0.71%; 27.20%] 
6.36% 
[0.17%; 20.86%] 
2.62% 
[0.23%; 9.56%] 
4.97% 
[2.50%; 10.62%] 
C(AB OR 
MB) 
1.98% 
[-2.2%; 9.1%] 
2.29% 
[-0.87%; 7.67%] 
-0.87% 
[-3.97%; 1.17%] 
-0.01% 
[-0.97%; 1.37%] 
0.03% 
[-0.80%; 1.16%] 
Note. U(AB): unique partition of attentional bias; U(MB): unique partition of memory bias; C(AB or MB): common partition of 
attentional and bias memory 
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Table S1. Meta-analytic commonality analysis on BDI-II depressive symptoms, across Study 
#1, #2, and #3 (total n = 243) 
 BDI #1 Sadness 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.1493, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.1152, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.1288, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0% 
[0%; 6.5%] 
2.46% 
[0.01%; 18.61%] 
0.24% 
[0%; 5.95%] 
0.66% 
[0.11%; 4.59%] 
U(MB) 14.82% 
[2.23%; 36.73%] 
7.15% 
[0.1%; 25.89%] 
10.76% 
[2.02%; 24.10%] 
10.44% 
[4.61%; 20.22%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.12% 
[-2.10%; 4.11%] 
1.91% 
[-1.22%; 6.96%] 
1.88% 
[-1.49%; 6.85%] 
0.81% 
[-0.62%; 3.53%] 
 BDI #2 Pessimism 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.1251, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.184, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.1152, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.02% 
[0%; 6.6%] 
6.85% 
[0.06%; 24.78%] 
0% 
[0%; 4.62%] 
0.64% 
0.12%; 4.08%] 
U(MB) 12.46% 
[1.61%; 29.51%] 
8.22% 
[0.61%; 23.83%] 
10.54% 
[1.42%; 27.47%] 
10.25% 
[4.54%; 19.38%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.03% 
[-2.29%; 3.33%] 
3.33% 
[-1.06%; 9.52%] 
0.98% 
[-2.71%; 5.09%] 
0.62% 
[-1.03%; 2.92%] 
 BDI #3 Failures 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.1373, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0507, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.1054, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.03% 
[0%; 8.44%] 
0.96% 
[0%; 8.83%] 
0.11% 
[0%; 4.68%] 
0.62% 
[0.1%; 4.00%] 
U(MB) 13.46% 
[1.62%; 33.12%] 
3.30% 
[0.02%; 15.34%] 
9.08% 
[0.81%; 23.94%] 
6.42% 
[2.38%; 14.86%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.25% 
[-2.38%; 4.79%] 
0.81% 
[-0.81%; 3.83%] 
1.35% 
[-1.49%; 5.38%] 
0.56% 
[-0.52%; 2.80%] 
 BDI #4 Anhedonia 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.008, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0242, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0581, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.19% 
[0%; 9.22%] 
0.06% 
[0%; 11.81%] 
1.61% 
[0.01%; 9.03%] 
1.24% 
[0.21%; 6.15%] 
U(MB) 0.54% 
[0%; 11.64%] 
2.15% 
[0.01%; 13.22%] 
5.40% 
[0.21%; 17.01%] 
2.51% 
[0.65%; 8.87%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.07% 
[-1.42%; 1.42%] 
0.21% 
[-1.91%; 3.20%] 
-1.18% 
[-4.23%; 0.98%] 
-0.14 
[-1.21%; 0.98%] 
 BDI #5 Guilt 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.2351, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0037, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0766, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 5.56% 0.15% 0.6% 1.15% 
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[0.15%; 16.74%] [0%; 7.72%] [0%; 6.29%] [0.28%; 5.20%] 
U(MB) 15.90% 
[2.81%; 35.96%] 
0.15% 
[0%; 6.78%] 
7.66% 
[0.51%; 22.05%] 
1.93% 
[0.72%; 7.53%] 
C(AB OR MB) 2.06% 
[-2.15%; 9.05%] 
0.07% 
[-1.15%; 1.64%] 
-0.60% 
[-3.89%; 2.18%] 
0.01% 
[-1.01%; 1.38%] 
 BDI #6 Punishment 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.108, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0054, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0163, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.37% 
[0%; 8.94%] 
0.03% 
[0%; 15.19%] 
0.74% 
[0%; 6.59%] 
0.91% 
[0.14%; 5.32%] 
U(MB) 9.94% 
[0.72%; 27.90%] 
0.53% 
[0%; 0.083%] 
0.45% 
[0%; 9.29%] 
1.27% 
0.34%; 6.70%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.48% 
[-1.37%; 4.30%] 
-0.03% 
[-1.97%; 1.73%] 
0.44% 
[-1.23%; 2.36%] 
0.12% 
[-0.86%; 1.43%] 
 BDI #7 Self-Aversion 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.1537, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.1043, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0596, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 2.46% 
[0.01%; 11.32%] 
2.34% 
[0.01%; 15.81%] 
0.63% 
[0%; 6.64%] 
1.33% 
[0.22%; 5.80%] 
U(MB) 11.71% 
[0.84%; 31.76%] 
6.34% 
[0.18%; 21.42%] 
5.95% 
[0.11%; 20.16%] 
7.24% 
[2.53%; 16.19%] 
C(AB OR MB) 1.20% 
[-1.40%; 6.40%] 
1.74% 
[-1.06%; 7.85%] 
-0.62% 
[-3.93%; 1.63%] 
0.21% 
[-1.74%; 2.37%] 
 BDI #8 Self-criticism 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.0882, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0934, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0239, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.40% 
[0%; 7.45%] 
4.51% 
[0.03%; 19.26%] 
0.68% 
[0%; 6.57%] 
1.02% 
[0.19%; 5.23%] 
U(MB) 7.98% 
[0.49%; 23.57%] 
3.15% 
[0.02%; 12.98%] 
2.21% 
[0.01%; 12.64%] 
3.39% 
[0.96%; 10.02%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.44% 
[-1.16%; 3.76%] 
1.68% 
[-0.48%; 6.70%] 
-0.49% 
[-2.83%; 1.23%] 
0.11% 
[-1.26%; 1.71%] 
 BDI #9 Suicidality 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.0798, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.1375, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0362, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.02% 
[0%; 9.58%] 
1.40% 
[0%; 12.74%] 
0.23% 
[0%; 4.2%] 
0.61% 
[0.09%; 3.98%] 
U(MB) 7.96% 
[0.49%; 23.94%] 
10.50% 
[0.56%; 30.01%] 
3.62% 
[0.01%; 16.21%] 
6.28% 
[2.08%; 15.01%] 
C(AB OR MB) -0.01% 
[-3.18%; 2.53%] 
1.85% 
[-1.60%; 6.29%] 
-0.23% 
[-2.57%; 1.16%] 
0.06% 
[-1.59%; 1.21%] 
 BDI #10 Cry 
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Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
0598, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0723, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.1171, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 2.76% 
[0.01%; 15.40%] 
3.60% 
[0.01%; 
19.63%]] 
2.61% 
[0.01%; 11.56%] 
2.90% 
[0.62%; 9.50%] 
U(MB) 2.63% 
[0.01%; 17.90%] 
2.34% 
[0.01%; 11.66%] 
11.19% 
[1.96%; 24.93%] 
3.77% 
[1.30%; 10.74%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.58% 
[-0.94%; 4.74%] 
1.29% 
[-0.57%; 6.20%] 
-2.10% 
[-5.62%; 1.74%] 
-0.12% 
[-1.35%; 2.42%] 
 BDI #11 Agitation 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
0405, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0360, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.06, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 1.21% 
[0%; 13.66%] 
1.07% 
[0%; 10.77%] 
0% 
[0%; 4.63%] 
0.66% 
[0.09%; 4.35%] 
U(MB) 2.46% 
[0.01%; 14.41%] 
1.90% 
[0.01%; 12.81%] 
5.58% 
[0.27%; 17.96%] 
3.04% 
[0.83%; 9.65%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.38% 
[-1.04%; 3.39%] 
0.64% 
[-0.88%; 4.39%] 
0.43% 
[-2.17%; 3.86%] 
0.24% 
[-0.58%; 2.29%] 
 BDI #12 Loss of Interest 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
0984, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0639, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0598, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.73% 
[0%; 8.29%]] 
4.06% 
[0.01%; 19.92%] 
0.17% 
[0%; 4.89%] 
0.77% 
[0.14%; 4.49%] 
U(MB) 8.52% 
[0.19%; 25.52%] 
1.28% 
[0%; 13.09%] 
5.90% 
[0.1%; 18.81%] 
3.82% 
[1.11%; 11.60%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.58% 
[-0.89%; 5.60%] 
1.04% 
[-1.27%; 4.45%] 
-0.09 
[-3%; 2.46%] 
0.25% 
[-1.04%; 2.29%] 
 BDI #13 Indecision 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.1697, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0525, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0707, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.78% 
[0%; 11.28%] 
0% 
[0%; 5.65%] 
0% 
[0%; 4.29%] 
0.50% 
[0.07%; 3.53%] 
U(MB) 16.73% 
[2.55%; 37.70%] 
5.11% 
[0.08%; 18.99%] 
6.46% 
[0.33%; 19.24%] 
7.29% 
[2.79%; 15.99%] 
C(AB OR MB) -0.55% 
[-4.27%; 3.06%] 
0.14% 
[-2.34%; 2.92%] 
0.61% 
[-1.98%; 4.30%] 
0.11% 
[-1.42%; 1.87%] 
 BDI #14 Worthlessness 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.3259, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.1644, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0725, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 1.19% 
[0%; 8.39%] 
12.64% 
[1.14%; 30.12%] 
0.45% 
[0%; 5.21%] 
1.05% 
[0.28%; 4.77%] 
U(MB) 29.92% 1.61% 7.25% 5.78% 
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[13.41%; 
48.95%] 
[0.01%; 12.30%] [0.41%; 21.81%] [2.82%; 13.71%] 
C(AB OR MB) 1.48% 
[-1.55%; 8.70%] 
2.18% 
[-1.05%; 7.66%] 
-0.44% 
[-3.22%; 2.59%] 
0.39% 
[-1.43%; 2.89%] 
 BDI #15 Lack of Energy 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.0680%, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0902, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0233, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 4.10% 
[0.02%; 16.44%] 
3.12% 
[0.02%; 15.71%] 
0.04% 
[0%; 4.99%] 
0.95% 
[0.20%; 5.03%] 
U(MB) 2.07% 
[0%; 13.85%] 
4.28% 
[0.05%; 16.12%] 
2.27% 
[0.01%; 11.74%] 
2.72% 
[0.65%; 8.71%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.63% 
[-0.74%; 4.82%] 
1.63% 
[-0.59%; 6.73%] 
0.02% 
[-2%; 2.32%] 
0.29% 
[-0.83%; 2.19%] 
 BDI #16 Sleep Problems 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.0501%, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0139, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0921, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 1.43% 
[0%; 12.87%] 
0.02% 
[0%; 6.5%] 
2.47% 
[0.03%; 10.13%] 
1.24% 
[0.26%; 5.60%] 
U(MB) 3.13% 
[0.01%; 19.15%] 
1.27% 
[0%; 12.9%] 
4.24% 
[0.05%; 16.11%] 
2.72% 
[0.61%; 9.95%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.46% 
[-1.14%; 3.19%] 
0.10% 
[-1.28%; 2.61%] 
2.50% 
[-0.01%; 7.26%] 
0.34% 
[-0.45%; 2.14%] 
 BDI #17 Irritability 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.1417%, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0362, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0326, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.04% 
[0%; 7.34] 
3.33% 
[0.04%; 13.62%] 
2.40% 
[0.02%; 9.43%] 
1.64% 
[0.40%; 5.97%] 
U(MB) 13.85% 
[2.77%; 30.95%] 
0.04% 
[0%; 6.95%] 
1.75% 
[0.01%; 9.79%] 
1.56% 
[0.52%; 6.31%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.28% 
[-2.18%; 4.21%] 
0.25% 
[-1.89%; 2.31%] 
-0.88% 
[-3.25%; 0.57%] 
-0.22% 
[-1.55%; 0.99%] 
 BDI #18 Eating Problems 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.0017%, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.0273, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0255, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0.05% 
[0%; 9.11%] 
1.43% 
[0%; 17.35%] 
0.03% 
[0%; 3.34%] 
0.43% 
[0.06%; 3.23%] 
U(MB) 0.1% 
[0%; 6.15%] 
0.82% 
[0%; 11.86%] 
2.19% 
[0.03%; 9.22%] 
1.11% 
[0.22%; 5.13%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.02% 
[-1.04%; 0.81%] 
0.48% 
[-1.71%; 4.28%] 
0.33% 
[-1.2%; 2.13%] 
0.06% 
[-0.71%; 0.83%] 
 BDI #19 Concentration Problems 
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Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.0399, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.1638, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0635, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 3.97% 
[0.04%; 15.50%] 
3.71% 
[0.05%; 14.63%] 
0.01% 
[0%; 4.06%] 
0.85% 
[0.21%; 4.23%] 
U(MB) 0.13% 
[0%; 7.91%] 
9.92% 
[1.32%; 24.96%] 
5.70% 
[0.42%; 16.48%] 
2.55% 
[0.96%; 8.11%] 
C(AB OR MB) -0.10% 
[-1.49%; 1.97%] 
2.74% 
[-0.64%; 8.91%] 
0.64% 
[-1.84%; 3.85%] 
0.28% 
[-0.84%; 1.90%] 
 BDI #20 Fatigue 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.0865, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.1029, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0102, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 0% 
[0%; 6.62%] 
2.32% 
[0.01%; 12.77%] 
0.49% 
[0%; 6.4%] 
0.87% 
[0.16%; 4.74%] 
U(MB) 8.58% 
[0.31%; 26.27%] 
6.25% 
[0.07%; 21.76%] 
0.81% 
[0%; 7.47%] 
2.06% 
[0.58%; 7.88%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.07% 
[-2.28%; 2.36%] 
1.72% 
[-0.54%; 6.45%] 
-0.27% 
[-2.06%; 1.12%] 
0.06% 
[-1.27%; 1.17%] 
 BDI #21 Loss of Interest in Sex 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #1, R2 = 
.0192, n = 64 
Study #2, R2 = 
.1202, n = 70 
Study #3, R2 = 
.0481, n = 109 
Fixed Effect 
Common 
Estimator 
U(AB) 1.26% 
[0%; 12.94%] 
1.28% 
[0%; 13.21%] 
1.02% 
[0%; 6.75%] 
1.15% 
[0.17%; 5.92%] 
U(MB) 0.49% 
[0%; 10.88%] 
9.10% 
[0.52%; 24.95%] 
4.63% 
[0.06%; 17.27%] 
3.22% 
[0.97%; 10.19%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.17% 
[-1.33%; 1.87%] 
1.64% 
[-0.93%; 6.98%] 
-0.84% 
[-3.52%; 0.93%] 
-0.05% 
[-1.18%; 1.21%] 
Note. U(AB): unique partition of attentional bias; U(MB): unique partition of memory bias; C(AB 
or MB): common partition of attentional or bias memory 
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Table S2. Commonality analysis on CESD depressive symptoms in Study #4 (n = 220) 
 CESD #1 Irritation CESD #2 Eating 
Problems 
CESD #3 Rumination 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #4, R2 = .0258, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .0200, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .0941 n = 
220 
U(AB) 1.20% 
[0%; 6.17%] 
0.16% 
[0%; 2.18%] 
0.91% 
[0%; 4.92%] 
U(MB) 1.13% 
[0%; 5.92%] 
1.93% 
[0.02%; 7.57%] 
8.95% 
[2.84%; 17.67%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.24% 
[-0.11%; 1.26%] 
-0.09% 
[-0.54%; 0.26%] 
-0.46% 
[-1.53%; 0.63%] 
 CESD #4 Worthlessness CESD #5 Concentration 
Problems 
CESD #6 Depressed 
Mood 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #4, R2 = .1387, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .0274, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .2006, n = 
220 
U(AB) 0.16% 
[0%; 2.53%] 
0.03% 
[0%; 1.88%] 
3.17% 
[0.37%; 8.65%] 
U(MB) 13.87% 
[4.12%; 26.49%] 
2.74% 
[0.15%; 8.14%] 
18.15% 
[8.20%; 29.04%] 
C(AB OR MB) -0.16% 
[-1.06%; 1.21%] 
-0.03% 
[-0.52%; 0.53%] 
-1.26% 
[-3.10%; 0.64%] 
 CESD #7 Fatigue CESD #8 Hopelessness CESD #9 Failure 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #4, R2 = .0186, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .1903, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .2402, n = 
220 
U(AB) 0.10% 
[0%; 2.82%] 
3.22% 
[0.49%; 8.24%] 
1.68% 
[0.07%; 5.45%] 
U(MB) 1.83% 
[0.02%; 7.25%] 
17.05% 
[6.45%; 30.50%] 
23.32% 
[7.55%; 41.09%] 
C(AB OR MB) -0.06% 
[-0.58%; 0.46%] 
-1.24% 
[-3.14%; 0.56%] 
-0.97% 
[-2.77%; 0.45%] 
 CESD #10 Fearfulness CESD #11 Sleep 
Problems 
CESD #12 Unhappiness 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #4, R2 = .0643, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .0491, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .1246, n = 
220 
U(AB) 0.02% 
[0%; 1.82%] 
1.17% 
[0.01%; 4.47%] 
0.32% 
[0%; 3.17%] 
U(MB) 6.29% 
[1.07%; 15.51%] 
4.11% 
[0.14%; 12.55%] 
12.41% 
[4.48%; 22.90%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.12% 
[-0.52%; 1.12%] 
-0.37% 
[-1.16%; 0.25%] 
-0.26% 
[-1.27%; 0.98%] 
 CESD #13 
Untalkativeness 
CESD #14 Loneliness CESD #15 People 
Unfriendly 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #4, R2 = .0447, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .1204, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .0151, n = 
220 
U(AB) 0.01% 
[0%; 1.81%] 
0% 
[0%; 1.71%] 
0.64% 
[0%; 3.00%] 
U(MB) 4.38% 
[0.43%; 12.08%] 
11.96% 
[4.13%; 23.44%] 
1.02% 
[0%; 6.42%] 
C(AB OR MB) 0.08% 0.08% -0.14% 
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[-0.40%; 1.03%] [-0.64%; 1.70%] [-0.75%; 0.13%] 
 CESD #16 Lack of Joie 
de Vivre 
CESD #17 Cry CESD #18 Sadness 
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #4, R2 = .1379, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .0598, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .1861, n = 
220 
U(AB) 1.07% 
[0%; 5.66%] 
1.18% 
[0%; 5.28%] 
1.12% 
[0.01%; 4.52%] 
U(MB) 13.31% 
[4.66%; 25.32%] 
5.22% 
[0.88%; 12.74%] 
18.18% 
[8.42%; 29.88%] 
C(AB OR MB) -0.59% 
[-2.12%; 0.70%] 
-0.42% 
[1.53%; 0.34%] 
-0.69% 
[-2.12%; 0.58%] 
 CESD #19 People 
Dislike 
CESD #20 Empasse  
Commonality 
Analysis 
Study #4, R2 = .0376, n = 
220 
Study #4, R2 = .0201, n = 
220 
U(AB) 0.46% 
[0%; 3.51%] 
0.35% 
[0%; 3.02%] 
U(MB) 3.51% 
[0.30%; 10.11%] 
1.79% 
[0.02%; 7.09%] 
C(AB OR MB) -0.21% 
[-0.96%; 0.44%] 
-0.13% 
[-0.60%; 0.27%] 
Note. U(AB): unique partition of attentional bias; U(MB): unique partition of memory bias; C(AB or 
MB): common partition of attentional or bias memory 
 
 
 
